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As technology advances at an ever-quickening pace, it has become more 
important to identify ways to capture and measure the spectrum of benefits information 
technology resources can provide.  In today’s competitive global economy, organizations 
that best employ and manage knowledge assets to maximize process executions, and 
improve process outputs, will prosper.  Through the analytic form of analysis known as 
the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology, this thesis will identify a technique to 
measure the performance of knowledge assets.  The resulting values can be compared in 
varying notional scenarios to assess potential improvements for knowledge-intensive 
processes.  This method of analysis will demonstrate how reengineered processes enable 
organizations to reduce costs, and maximize knowledge creation and production capacity. 
A Proof of Concept was developed to analyze the long-established Shipyard 
planning yard processes, which supports maintenance and modernization of the U.S. 
Navy Fleet.  With these baseline processes as the cornerstone for academic analysis, the 
KVA methodology shows iterations of varying scenarios using automated data capture 
and collaborative technology, and the return each provides.  Most importantly, the 
methodology establishes evidence which suggests reengineered shipyard planning yard 
processes will shorten the duration of Navy ship availabilities, while reducing the annual 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND  
All organizations operate in an environment of competition and limited resources.  
The most successful organizations are typically those prepared to maximize intelligent 
use of available resources.  With strategies based on a guiding vision, successful 
organizations have policies in place to remain current and competitive despite the 
constantly evolving technological environment.  The Department of Defense (DoD) is not 
an exception to these organizational generalizations.  Within the constraints of the 
defense budget, the wide range of military operational commitments, and an intricate 
acquisition process, defense leaders have an inherent responsibility to properly maintain 
and modernize the United States Armed Forces to retain the competitive advantage, and 
widen the gap to maintain technological superiority in an unpredictable world.  
The DoD spends more than $59 billion per year on a broad range of defense 
maintenance capabilities and programs.  With a current inventory of approximately 300 
ships, 15,000 aircraft, 900 strategic missiles, and 330,000 ground vehicles, the need for 
maintenance programs is evident. (DoD Maintenance Policy, 2004) Navy Fleet 
maintenance and modernization efforts for fiscal year 2005 amounted to 85 ship and 
submarine scheduled availabilities—that is, the assignment of a ship to an industrial 
activity to accomplish repairs, maintenance, or modernization tasks—at a cost of $3.9 
billion. (Hugel, 2005)  Given this relatively high cost of maintenance activities and 
relative ease at which those activities are funded, it may be concluded that the nation’s 
leaders are committed to maintaining force operational readiness, superior technological 
edge, and quality material condition of assets.   
Of any service, the Navy must be extremely diligent in its maintenance efforts.  
Ships and submarines provide great value to national defense objectives; however, the 
environment, tempo, and duration of typical naval deployments increase the need for 
proper maintenance and modernization.  The Maintenance Policy for U.S. Navy Ships 
delineates maintenance and modernizations efforts as those aimed “to define and manage 
the material condition requirements and the configuration of Navy ships.”  As such, 
2maintenance and modernization policy is carefully designed to keep Navy ships operating 
at the maximum level of material readiness possible. (OPNAVINST 4700.7K)  This need 
is carefully balanced with the reasonable expectation of asset availability to Fleet 
Commanders, since naval vessels undergoing repair, maintenance, or modernization in an 
industrial activity facility are unavailable for operational tasking until scheduled work is 
complete.  Although availability periods can range in duration, traditional restricted 
availability periods last six months.   
 
B. PURPOSE 
This research will address the conjectural benefits resulting from the integration 
of new information technology (IT) assets into existing Navy shipyard design processes, 
with focus on the work and output generated at the public-sector Planning Yard facilities.  
Executing many knowledge-intensive, inherently complex, yet technologically outdated 
design processes, the concept of the Naval planning yard could benefit with a new, IT-
based infrastructure.  The modern concept of knowledge management will be addressed, 
and a knowledge-based methodology will be employed to complete an analytic 
representation of the potential return-on-investment provided by the IT asset, expressed 
in terms of cost savings, return on knowledge, and return on IT.  From the results of this 
analysis, possible benefits to the DoD and U.S. Navy will be inferred. 
As a Proof of Concept, the processes executed at Puget Sound Planning Yard, 
located in Bremerton, Washington, will be explored.  The current, “as is” process will be 
reevaluated in reengineered notional scenarios incorporating Commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) technology, including 3-dimensional (3D) laser scanners, a proprietary approach 
to digital imaging created by Spatial Integrated Systems (SIS), and a collaborative 
environment technology marketed by UGS Corporation.  The Knowledge Value-Added 
(KVA) methodology will be utilized to compare the “as-is” environment against notional 
environments that represent maximum use of the new IT resources, with the data 
applicable to Puget Sound Planning Yard aggregated to represent the four existing public-
sector planning yard facilities.  Finally, justifications for or against these technologies, 
based on KVA analysis results and other applicable research, will be provided as 
recommendations to the Navy.  Potential uses for 3D digital modeling and collaborative 
3technologies in domains outside of the maintenance and modernization realm of activities 
will be considered.   
 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to analyze the potential benefits investment in 
data-capturing and collaboration-based information technology could provide in public 
sector organizations, where “profits” are never part of the return on investment equation.  
Instead, this research will attempt to find benefits in terms of cost savings, increased 
process capacity and productivity, and reduced cycle time for the Naval Fleet.  This 
analysis will apply a return on investment methodology capable of demonstrating these 
advantages in common units of measurement.   
Application of this model will provide important insight into the value-adding 
performance of knowledge assets in a public-sector organization and its defined 
processes.  The analytical approach used, with knowledge theory in its roots, will help 
identify ways process capacity within public sector organizations may be improved by 
increasing the value of organizational knowledge assets, both human and IT-based.  The 
information that results from this analysis can be used to make educated and less risky 
acquisition decisions.  Furthermore, it can be used to explore the potential benefits 
derived from the introduction of IT assets, along with improved engineering into many 
different processes, across a wide range of organizations.   
 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Any new IT introduced into modern organization processes always carries a 
certain degree of risk, as its benefits cannot always be accurately predicted.  Through use 
of the KVA methodology, a decision support model will highlight quantitative evidence 
based on measurable data and analytical criteria, and demonstrate the impact of IT 
systems, specifically 3-dimensional terrestrial laser scanners and collaborative 
environment technologies, in the planning yard processes.  Proponents of laser scanners 
and collaborative environments purport that their technology frees resources, reduces 
time, improves process efficiencies, and empowers professionals in a variety of ways. 
4The subject in question, then, is whether acquisition and use of laser scanners and 
collaborative environments in planning and execution of ship maintenance might 1) 
decrease cycle time for U.S. Navy ships by minimizing downtime in shipyards, 2) lessen 
maintenance cost by eliminating or reducing DOD planning yard labor costs, 3) over 
time, allow the nation’s leaders to revise force planning through reduced cycle time, and 
4) improve productivity in current planning yard ship check processes to a degree which 
would allow for greater shipboard modernization.  Finally, information technology 
improvements, particularly the effective capture and storage of ship-specific data, along 
with the introduction of collaboration and data-sharing, could greatly contribute to the 
productivity of Navy organizations outside of the planning yard, including all 
downstream processes, particularly the public and private-sector shipyards which perform 
the maintenance, modernization, and repair work on Navy vessels.   
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will attempt to model the current DoD planning yard core processes, 
and predict as accurately as possible a reengineered process model which incorporates 
recently developed information technology applications.  The Knowledge Value Added 
methodology will be applied within the Proof of Concept (POC) case study to measure 
the impact that an introduction of 3D modeling and collaborative technology will have on 
the current process model.  First, all major inputs, processes, and respective outputs will 
be identified by means of an interview process with planning yard Subject Matter Experts 
(SME).  This analysis will include a cost estimate based on the salary of personnel 
involved in each process.  The subprocess analysis will include planning yard estimates 
for the “time to learn” each process, the number of personnel involved, and the number of 
times each process is executed.  Market comparable values will be used to help estimate 
cost figures and add value to the methodology. 
To ensure all estimates are reliable, Subject Matter Experts will be asked to rank 
order the processes in order of complexity, and a correlation will be calculated.  A high 
correlation value ensures quality estimates.  The time-to-learn, otherwise described as the 
knowledge embedded in each subprocess, either embedded in the technology or within 
the personnel, will be multiplied by the number of executions of that subprocess.  The 
5resulting figure will be used as a basis for the KVA approach for allocating revenue at the 
subprocess level.  For “to-be” and “radical-to-be” models, subject matter experts in the 
areas of laser scanning, digital imaging, modeling, AUTOCAD, and collaborative 
technology applications will be consulted, and their resources will be tapped extensively 
to ensure reliable estimates.  Comparing the end values can assist decision makers in 
determining the ROI benefits of new IT into the planning yard process. 
 
F. SCOPE 
“Maintenance and Modernization” is a very broad concept, with a myriad of 
interrelating concepts, instructions, policies, and specializations for study.  In a perfect 
world, this research would address all areas of the shipyard industry and its stakeholders, 
from shipbuilding, to maintenance and modernization, and repair.  Certainly, the IT assets 
considered in this research, and information management could benefit each of these 
specific areas.  However, the scope of this research is limited to a relatively narrow field: 
the Planning Yard industry, and the shipcheck process it conducts for maintenance and 
modernization efforts.  To be even more specific, shipchecks are conducted on Navy 
vessels for four fundamental purposes: alteration design, material assessment, alteration 
planning, and repair planning.  This research will not cover any specifics of repair 
planning or material assessment shipchecks, nor will it reach beyond the planning phase 
into the realm of production.  It is hoped that the reader will bear in mind that any 
benefits or return on investment demonstrated in this thesis only begins to uncover the 
potential of IT in the much larger shipyard industry.   
 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis research will be organized in the following manner: 
Chaper I will include an overview of this research project, and will identify the 
primary objectives and questions of focus.  The methodology used to reach conclusions 
and make recommendations is described.  Chapter II contains a literature review of the 
topics necessary to understand the Puget Sound Planning Yard Proof of Concept case 
study, found in Chapter IV.  The topics covered by the literature review include current 
Navy Shipyard initiatives, Defense Acquisition, principles of knowledge management, 
6Real Options Analysis, and information on terrestrial laser scanners and collaborative 
technology.  Chapter III discusses the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology in 
great detail, to enhance the reader’s understanding of the knowledge-based return on 
investment methodology applied in this thesis to draw conclusions.  Finally, Chapter V 
will summarize the research efforts, state conclusions, and make recommendations to the 
Navy and Department of Defense. 
7II. LITERATURE REVIEW   
A. CURRENT NAVY SHIPYARD INITIATIVES 
America's naval shipyards went through a major transformation during the 1990s, 
declining from eight public shipyards and more than 70,000 employees to the current size 
of four shipyards and 23,500 employees. (Klemm, 2002)  Despite this reduction, 
maintenance capability remains intact, as many tasks are outsourced to private industry.  
For the four remaining public shipyards, significant effort is being put towards 
standardization and improvement of operations across the board, evident in the 
SHIPMAIN initiative, the inception of SHAPEC1, and in the various updates and 
iterations of the long-standing Fleet Modernization Plan (FMP).  The current focus in the 
shipyard industry and all pertinent policies is find methods to streamline ship availability 
processes, regularize procedures, and improve maintenance and modernization activities.   
1. Fleet Modernization Plan 
The purpose of the FMP as written in the document is to outline the process for 
the “identification, approval, development, funding, and execution of characteristic 
chances to the U.S. Navy ships and service craft, ensuring installation of a Certified 
Battle Force Configuration.”  Theoretically, FMP doctrine enables the Navy to maintain 
up-to-date configuration control of its assets, and prevents unexpected ship alterations, 
interferences and costs.  In practice, the effectiveness of Navy configuration control 
might be contested.  Several distinct processes are outlined in the FMP, including ship 
alteration (SHIPALT) development, FMP Program Development, Program Objectives 
Memorandum (POM), Budget Development, and Program Execution.  The FMP was 
recently revised, and its 2005 Strategic Plan’s primary mission is to “provide a 
disciplined process to deliver operational and technical modifications to the FLEET in the 
most operationally effective and cost efficient way.” (FMP, 2005)  The Strategic Plan 
further defines a standard methodology to plan, budget, engineer, and install 
                                                 
1 SHAPEC is the Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center, a Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) with the goal of standardizing practices and procedures to accomplish ship work by: 1) 
Determine technical planning and material requirements, 2) development of reusable planning products, 
and 3) establishment of a data warehouse of planning products.  Retrieved Fall, 2005, from 
http://www.shapec.spear.navy.mil 
8technologically current and affordable shipboard improvements.  The overarching goals 
contained in the FMP Plan, in allowing for ship improvements is to: 
1. Maintain a war-ready fleet  
2. Correct safety concerns or equipment deficiencies  
3. Maximize ship maintenance and reliability  
4. Reduce the burden of work on ship’s force  
The process contained within the FMP most pertinent to this research is the 
SHIPALT.  In the context of Naval shipyards, an alteration is considered any change in a 
ship’s hull, machinery, equipment, or fittings, which involves a change in design, 
materials, number, location, or relationship of any assembly’s component parts.  This 
includes changes that are separate from, incidental to, or in conjunction with repairs. (ISR 
Glossary, 2005) 
2. SHIPMAIN 
A family of maintenance initiatives, SHIPMAIN was launched in the fall of 2002 
to address the existing culture problems at Navy shipyards.  It remains a current policy; 
its tenants are works in progress.  Initiated by former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
Admiral Vern Clark, SHIPMAIN lays out the framework to ensure that Navy shipyards 
are transformed to best accomplish the maintenance and modernization tasks required to 
keep U.S. Naval forces technologically superior.  The goal of SHIPMAIN is to ensure all 
shipyard processes are redesigned, with consistency among different maintenance 
facilities, to preserve ship quality and lifespan within schedule constraints.  Navy 
leadership believes the SHIPMAIN incentive will ultimately reduce the overall cost of 
ship maintenance and modernization by installing a common planning process for surface 
ship alterations.  By installing a disciplined management process with objective 
measurements, SHIPMAIN strives to increase the efficiency of the process without 
compromising its effectiveness.  Finally, the initiative will institutionalize the process, 
and implement a continuous improvement method. (Balisle & Lafleur, 2003)  The 
overarching concept behind SHIPMAIN is “one shipyard,” and its tenants are currently 
either in place, in process of being implemented, or in the planning phase.   
One of the biggest changes introduced by SHIPMAIN applicable to this research 
is the concept of the Ship Change Document (SCD).  Considered a consolidated version 
9of former SHIPALT documents, the SCD is now the input resource for a web-enabled 
database called the Navy Data Environment—Navy Modernization (NDE-NM).  With 
full automation of NDE-NM released in June 2005, its utilization was, and continues to 
be a major change in ship modernization processes.  For example, use of a web-enabled 
database supersedes many FMP requirements.  It collapses a broad range of alteration 
types into two (Fleet and Program), consolidates several modernization practices, 
processes, and supporting documents, and provides a simple decision making process for 
modernizing naval vessels.  Decision boards are in place to adjudicate an estimated 75 
percent of proposed ship changes and all Fleet Alterations.  In this process, the 
authoritative document for each proposed change is the SCD, and it supersedes 
documents required in the FMP.  The SCD is updated at each decision point, and includes 
technical, cost, and mission criticality information.  Approval of a proposed ship change 
is based on a variety of factors, including a measure of how much benefit the proposed 
change would provide the Fleet.  It is hoped that increased review of ship change 
proposals will minimize unnecessary costs. (Tate, 2005) 
 
B. DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
The federal government spends an estimated $60 billion each year on IT products 
and services.  While this figure seems high, it is not surprising, as IT is integrated into 
nearly every government process.  Given the rapid pace with which technology is 
evolving, it is vital that federal acquisitions focus on those applications that offer the best 
benefits for facilitating information storage, management, sharing, collaboration, and 
dissemination.   
1. Strategy 
The DoD employs a management process known as the Defense Acquisition 
System to provide timely, useful, and cost-effective systems to its troops.  When a 
specific defense-related need is identified, an Acquisition Program is funded and 
organized to provide a solution.  While the Acquisition Strategy based most of its 
acquisitions on concepts delineated in the National Security Strategy, it also is poised to 
“support not only today’s force, but also the next force, and future forces beyond that.” 
(DoDD 5000.1, 2003)  To support future forces, present-day consideration of the best-
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suited IT acquisitions is vital to the overall maintenance of a modernized and 
technologically superior Armed Force.  Within the DoD Acquisition infrastructure, a 
Science and Technology (S&T) program exists to address user needs, and to maintain a 
broad-based program spanning all Defense-relevant technologies to anticipate future 
needs.  At present, Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) is the preferred DoD strategy for rapid 
acquisition of mature technologies, as it delivers capability in increments and considers 
the possibility of future technological improvements. (DoDD 5000.1, 2003) 
2. IT Investments 
Within the Department of Defense Acquisition System, IT programs strive to treat 
acquired systems as long-term investments rather than mere acquisitions.  As such, the 
prospect for a system’s life cycle is an important consideration with new investments.  In 
accordance with legislation such as the Information Technology Management and Results 
Act (ITMRA), effective August 8, 1996, and the better known Clinger-Cohen Act, the 
DoD seeks to develop and use performance metrics to best measure the benefits gained in 
an IT investment process.  This legislation places focus on the life cycle management of 
IT and the processes supported by that technology, and ensures that IT initiatives 
proceed, on schedule, toward milestones which meet the user’s requirements and deliver 
intended benefits.  High risk or new technology projects receive closer scrutiny and more 
points of evaluation and review. (Browning, 2005)  
 
C. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
Few realize that the information age, as known today, dates back to the year 1956.  
Over the course of the 20th century, the percentage of work force employed in agricultural 
and manufacturing industries declined significantly.  This trend continues into the 21st 
century.  Fifty years ago, the year 1956 marked the date in which automated processes 
enabled more employment in “knowledge work” than other fields.  Since then, society 
has evolved in many ways, quickly adopting new information technologies to take 
advantage of the constant advances in communication and computing speeds, and data 
storage capacities.  With a myriad of available options in a constantly expanding IT 
market, managers frequently look for ways to justify the expenses that come with new 
hardware, software, and computing options. 
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The underlying assumption of knowledge management is that modern day 
information-centric organizations have two types of resources: people and IT.  
Knowledge management is characterized by a process of “systematically and actively 
managing and leveraging the vast stores of knowledge and information that exist within a 
typical company.”  Through knowledge management metrics, an organization’s 
knowledge assets can be identified and enhanced to improve overall performance. 
(McKeen & Smith, 2003)   
1. Knowledge as an Asset 
Knowledge should be considered an asset to an organization, similar to known 
assets like capital, labor, natural resources, and machinery.  Like these other assets, 
knowledge has no value unless it is used.  Conversely, knowledge is very different from 
these familiar assets.  First, knowledge can be used without being consumed, exists 
independently of space (it can be in more than one place at a time), and is very sensitive 
to time.  Secondly, knowledge is extremely abundant, making it contrary to the law of 
economics which implies that value is a derivative of scarcity, not abundance.  Third, the 
cost structure of knowledge-intensive goods is very different from the cost-structure of 
physical assets, where the cost of an initial product may be significantly higher than 
replications of that product, (i.e., software).  Finally, there is no correlation between 
knowledge input and knowledge output.  Creative work depends on the individual, and 
the value of knowledge therein cannot be related to the cost of acquiring that knowledge.  
Knowledge does not follow the common principles of economics, and must be analyzed 
in a manner quite different from ordinary economic resources. (McKeen & Smith, 2003)    
2. Strategies for Knowledge Management 
In order to effectively manage the knowledge assets in an organization, a strategy 
must be in place.  There are five primary tasks inherent in organizations for knowledge 
management: 1) generating knowledge, 2) accessing knowledge, 3) representing and 
embedding knowledge, 4) facilitating knowledge, and 5) generalizing knowledge. 
(McKeen & Smith, 2003) 
Generating knowledge implies that organizations must constantly foster new ideas 
and develop new and improved processes.  This can be done by investing in human 
capital, implementing methods of rewarding innovation, and by applying new knowledge 
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as it is generated.  Accessing knowledge includes the development of policies and 
processes that not only capture knowledge, but also developing the tools to use that 
knowledge.  In representing and embedding knowledge, it is known that knowledge 
comes in a variety of different forms.  These forms include skill sets, experience, or 
brainpower.  Most knowledge is tacit, meaning it is understood but not expressed.  
However, a good strategy will have a method of minimizing tacit knowledge by 
representing knowledge and embedding it within the organizational structure.  Similarly, 
a good strategy will include a way of emphasizing the role knowledge plays within the 
organization’s day-to-day successes.  This can be accomplished through experimentation 
and socialization, or through a leader’s empowerment of the knowledge process.  Finally, 
generalizing knowledge means that the organization must be able to adapt to its 
environment, be flexible and responsive, and achieve true organizational learning.  
Organizational learning and knowledge management are co-dependent. (McKeen & 
Smith, 2003)   
 
D. REAL OPTIONS 
Real Options Analysis is a market-based methodology invented to address the 
investment challenges faced by corporations in the modern day economy.  It suggests that 
corporate valuation depends less on traditional fundamentals, and more on future 
expectations.  The traditional discounted cash flow analysis methods: the income, cost, or 
market approach, tend to view risk and return on investment in a static view.  Dr. 
Johnathan Mun, an expert in Real Options Theory, and credited with making it 
operational in practice, theorizes that not all risk is bad; in fact, upside risk can often be 
advantageous.  Upside risk is defined simply as the opportunities that coincide with the 
threats for any given risk.  Dr. Mun’s interpretation of Real Options is often described as 
“a new way of thinking,” and he views capital investments in terms of a dynamic 
approach, since all decision making processes have generic and dynamic options 
associated with them.  Real Options Analysis is done by considering these real options, 
then using options theory to evaluate physical, vice financial assets.   
Dr. Mun identifies eight phases in the real options process framework.  The first 
phase begins with the qualification of projects through management screening, which 
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eliminates all but those projects management wants to evaluate.  The second phase starts 
with the construction of a discounted cash flow model under the base case condition.  
Next, Monte Carlo simulation is applied, and the results are inserted in the real options 
analysis.  This phase covers the identification of strategic options that exist for a 
particular project under review.  Based on the type of problem framed, the relevant real 
options models are chosen and executed.  Depending on the number of projects as well as 
management set constraints, portfolio optimization is performed.  The efficient allocation 
of resources is the outcome of this analysis.  The next phase involves creating reports and 
explaining to management the analytical results.  This step is critical in that an analytical 
process is only as good as its expositional ease.  Finally, the last phase involves updating 
the analysis over time. (Mun, 2002)  Real options analysis adds tremendous value to 
projects with uncertainty, but when uncertainty becomes resolved through the passage of 
time, old assumptions and forecasts have now become historical facts.  Therefore, 
existing models must be updated to reflect new facts and data.  This continual 
improvement and monitoring is vital in making clear, precise, and definitive decisions 
over time.  
 
E. TERRESTRIAL LASER SCANNING TECHNOLOGY  
This research will examine the relatively new and developing terrestrial 3-
dimensional laser scanning technology, and its related hardware and software 
components.  While there are a variety of laser scanning models available on the market, 
this research will use statistical information collected from Spatial Integrated System’s 
3DIS model (Figure 1).  SIS has developed a proprietary approach to digital modeling 
(2D or 3D) that will be addressed.   
 
Figure 1.   SIS Laser Scanning Equipment (courtesy of SIS, Inc.) 
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3DIS is employed as a 3D image and data capture system.  Upon its setup and 
execution, 3DIS works by scanning its predetermined environment: a compartment, or 
selected area within that compartment, with a pinpoint of laser light to quickly and 
accurately capture the digital space and distance information of that space or area.  At the 
same time, an embedded wide angle digital camera captures a photo image of the target.   
Once this data is captured, the technology automatically implements image-processing 
algorithms, and a digital point cloud results (Figure 2).  The graphical user interface 
(GUI) of the system portrays this point cloud as faint lines outlining the images within 
that space.  The actual file created is a long list of raw data in the form of (x,y,z) 
coordinates, and as an added feature, each point retains its original color information.  
These data points can then be connected and enhanced to create a realistic, 3D model. 
 
Figure 2.   Sample Point Cloud Image (USNS Ship Exterior) 
 
The file format used in the 3DIS system can be exported for further processing, such as 
3D CAD analysis and modeling.  The process for modeling the captured point cloud is 
more complex, and can be accomplished by way of several different paths.  This path is 
typically used for a whole compartment or topside area. 
1.   A point cloud is captured and saved by 3DIS Imager, the software which 
runs on the scanner. 
2.   The point cloud is viewed via 3DIS Viewer for a quick check of the data 
and point-to-point measurements. 
3.   Captured point clouds are registered to one another using Imageware, a 
point processing application. 
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4.   A surface model is constructed from the point cloud data. 
5.   The created surface model is imported into a CAD system and an 
assembly model of the space and components is completed. 
6.  Files are exported to AUTOCAD, as required. 
7.   Detailed information, such as engineering notes and dimension call-outs 
are added in AUTOCAD.2 
Completion of this process provides a workable, 3D model of the captured area or 
compartment.  From this model, prospective alterations can be visualized, accurate 
dimensions can be ascertained, and most importantly, the model may be reused many 
times over the life cycle of the naval vessel, and for vessels of the same class.  Figure 3, 
below, shows a completed 3D model composed from a series of point cloud images. 
 
Figure 3.   Digital 3D Model of USNS Superstructure 
 
Commercial uses of this technology have ranged from maritime and space 
applications, to manufacturing and production.  There is evidence to suggest that the 
market for laser scanning technology is expanding.  SPAR Point Research recently 
reported that market estimates for laser scanner applications would experience a 45 
percent increase in 2005. (Greaves, 2005)  This estimate was yielded from interviews 
with software and service providers, and laser scanner manufacturers, who report 
increasing activity in a wide variety of markets, including civil infrastructure, ship and 
boat building, and automobile manufacturing.   
In addition to this research, the National Shipyard Research Program (NSRP), a 
program designed to research methods to reduce naval ship construction and repair cost, 
                                                 
2 Information on the operation of the laser scanning equipment and its proprietary software, including 
these seven steps listed here, was provided by Spatial Integrated Systems Subject Matter Experts. 
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funded a study to explore the potential benefits of capturing ship check data in digital 
format, processing the digital data, and creating 3D CAD models from that data.  To date, 
this study is still in progress.  However, this data capture study coincided with NSRP’s 
implementation of a Common Parts Catalog at several U.S. shipyards.  Along with this 
accomplishment, a successful demonstration of digital design data transfer between many 
design tools occurred.  These events bring to light the remarkable, recent progress made 
towards Naval System Sea Command’s (NAVSEA) goal of a common, interoperable IT 
framework for ship construction, and life cycle management enterprises.  NSRP’s work 
with data interoperability refers to an Integrated Shipbuilding Environment (ISE) in 
which business processes and IT systems are able to accept, transfer, and disseminate 
electronically.  In this environment, information can be entered once and reused many 
times. (Product Interoperability, 2005)     
 
F. COLLABORATIVE TECHNOLOGY 
The market for collaborative technologies is also experiencing growth.  Created as 
an integrated set of IT-enabled functionalities, collaborative technologies enable 
synchronous and asynchronous communication.  At the same time, this type of 
technologically-enhanced collaboration allows simultaneous, real-time information 
sharing regardless of the user’s geographical location.  While many collaborative 
technologies exist, the most prominent in practice are internet-based applications, 
especially where users are geographically distributed.  Collaborative technologies can be 
especially effective by allowing groups to communicate, collaborate, and share 
knowledge regardless of time and space. (Gallaher & O’Rourke, 2004) 
1. Collaboration as an Information Strategy 
UGS, a leading global provider of product lifecycle management (PLM) software, 
develops enterprise solutions with innovation in mind.  Their work reflects the 
company’s method of consolidating systems, and employing a data structure to allow for 
collaboration.  The capabilities provided by the PLM enterprise strategy include 
streamlined processes, gained efficiencies, controlled costs, and connected systems and 
people for unified decision-making.  Additionally, UGS software allows for the creation 
and management of 3D models.  In fact, UGS creates or manages 40 percent of the 
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world’s 3D data. (UGS website, 2005)  The concepts employed by UGS in its PLM, and 
the capabilities of its software applications as a planning yard tool will be addressed in 


























III. THE KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED METHODOLOGY 
A. THE VALUE PROBLEM 
Before investigating the potential returns or benefits knowledge assets, either 
human or IT, can provide, one must understand the concept of “value.”  When new and 
promising IT resources are introduced into an organization, the value derived may take a 
variety of intangible forms, such as improved market competitiveness, expanded markets, 
new capabilities, or increased efficiency.  What value an organization receives from that 
IT asset depends on many factors beyond the entire capability of the asset, such as 
organizational culture, the management climate, and the organization’s commitment to 
training and maintenance.  Also important to note is the percentage of the IT resource’s 
full potential that is actually in use.  If the asset is rarely used or used at baseline 
functionality, then the perceived and actual value derived from the IT asset is likely low.  
Leveraging people, technologies, and information effectively within an organization can 
promote team cohesion and provides value. 
In other definitions of value, financial metrics tend to prevail.  In fact, most value 
assessments focus on return and cost of ownership for IT investments.  Monetary benefits 
are determined in commercial applications by assigning a price per unit to each process 
output.  However, these financial-based methods seldom capture the benefit streams 
produced by processes and resources in common, comparable units of measurement.  At 
the same time, financial metrics and benefits are difficult to apply in private-sector and 
government organizations.  The DoD, for example, will not be able to establish the 
monetary benefits, or the value added from combat effectiveness, operational readiness, 
and national defense.  Therefore, an alternate common unit must be used to determine the 
value added in public-sector process analysis. 
 
B. THE KVA SOLUTION 
The Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) methodology provides a framework for the 
analytical analysis of organizational knowledge assets.  Developed by Drs. Thomas 
Housel (Naval Postgraduate School) and Valerny Kanevsky (Agilent Lab), the theory of 
KVA has been published internationally, and has been applied in academic research and 
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various business consultations for over 15 years.  Executed properly, KVA will measure 
the value of knowledge embedded in an organization’s core processes, employees, and IT 
investments.  This measure is quantified in a return-on-knowledge (ROK) ratio, which 
can be used to identify how much value knowledge assets provide within each core 
business process.  In instances where revenue comparisons or other market-comparable 
values are available, a return on investment (ROI) figure can be ascertained. 
1. The Theory of KVA 
With its roots in the Information Age, the theory behind KVA follows the basic 
principles of thermodynamics by purporting that organizational outputs can be described 
in units of complexity.  More specifically, KVA theory is based on the concept of 
entropy, which connotes changes in the environment.  It follows that as all organizations 
collect input from various sources and add value in some way, the inputs are transformed 
to outputs, and the value added during that transition is proportionate to the amount of 
transformation necessary to change the inputs to the desired output.  A unit of change, 
therefore, is considered simply as a unit of complexity.  Belief in this assertion provides a 
method by which all organizational outputs can be measured in common units.  The value 
added to each process comes from organizational knowledge assets: people, processes, 
capabilities, or information technology.  Through estimation of this value, an analytical 
method for estimating the return on knowledge, using the knowledge inherent in 
organizational assets to describe process outputs with a common unit of measurement, is 
achieved.   
The knowledge used every day in the core processes of an organization can be 
translated to a numerical format, because knowledge is a surrogate for the process outputs 
measured in common units.  By capturing corporate knowledge into value, with clear 
figures to measure the value contained in each process, decision and policy makers can 
reengineer processes to maximize value.  Then, by seeing the returns each process 
generates, better decisions can be made for an organization.  Whether the knowledge is 
contained in IT systems or in the minds of an organization’s employees is irrelevant, 
because common units of knowledge can be observed in the organization’s core 
processes, and measured in terms of cost.  Similarly, this approach provides management 
a verifiable way to assign benefit streams and costs to sub-organizational outputs 
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produced by its knowledge assets, and can effectively redirect management’s investment 
focus from cost containment to value creation.   
Figure 4, below, shows a visual depiction of the KVA methodology’s underlying 
model and primary assumptions. 
 
Figure 4.   Assumptions of KVA (Housel & Bell, 2001) 
 
The assumptions presented in Figure 4 are the foundation of the KVA process.  
Accepting these assumptions allows the methodology to work in a way that breaks all 
input down into a common unit of output, allowing all processes to be evaluated from a 
common baseline reference.  Because of this, how data is collected, analyzed, and how 
easily it can be monetized, the methodology functions much like accounting.  As such, 
KVA results can be utilized in corporate finance and valuation problems.   
2. Core Process Identification 
In order to translate the knowledge utilized in an organization’s core processes to 
numerical form, it is important to accurately define what those core processes are, and to 
define the amount of change each process produces.  Typically, corporate executives or 
other Subject Matter Experts are able to identify the main processes executed by their 
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organization.  In some instances, work flow models exist and may be referenced.  In most 
instances, five to seven core processes sufficiently cover the core processes executed by 
an organization.  For each of those processes, boundaries must be established by 
identifying the end output of the process, including all subprocess outputs that eventually 
create the end product.  Any contribution IT provides to the process must be isolated. 
3. Approaches to KVA 
The knowledge within a process can be represented as learning time, process 
instructions, or information bits.  In theory, any approach that satisfies the basic KVA 
assumptions will create the same results; however, it must capture the “know-how” in the 
production of process outputs, given particular inputs.  Table 1 illustrates the steps used 
in three primary methods used to apply KVA.  The Binary Query Method will not be 
addressed in this research. 
 
Table 1. Three Approaches to KVA (Housel & Bell, 2001) 
 
a. Learning Time Approach 
In the learning time approach, the amount of knowledge embedded in a 
core process is represented by an estimate of the amount of time it would take an 
individual of average ability to learn that process’s execution well enough to successfully 
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create the same process output.  In capturing this estimate, learning time is proportional 
to the amount of knowledge learned, and thus indicates how much knowledge is 
embedded in that process.  In the context of this methodology, this figure is called 
“Actual Learning Time,” or ALT.  Learning Time must be measured in common units of 
time, and these units represent common units of output, which are described by the 
variable K.  Following this line of thought, a single execution of any process is equal to a 
single unit of output, represented by a given number of common units, K.   
The obvious question, then, is how one correctly estimates how long it 
would take for an average person to learn a certain process.  In practice, most Subject 
Matter Experts can provide quality estimates based on formal training times, on-the-job 
training, training manuals, and other programs, given a minimum explanation of what 
ALT is in terms of the KVA methodology.  It is important that SMEs understand that for 
each estimate, knowledge must only be counted when it is in use; otherwise, there is a 
tendency to overestimate the amount of knowledge contained in a given process.  Further, 
knowledge must only be counted if it is truly necessary to execute the process.  The 
shortest, most succinct approach to the process output must be considered, again, to avoid 
overestimation.   
b. Establishing Reliability 
Critics would argue that the Learning Time Approach is subjective and 
anecdotal.  However, several methods exist to ensure reliability and confidence of all 
estimates.  The most common way of ensuring reliable estimates is by calculating the 
correlation between the ALT, ordinal ranking, and relative learn time (RLT) for each 
process.  A correlation value greater than or equal to 80% is sufficient for establishing 
reliability, and is the preferred method of proving the estimates credible.  The three terms 
are described in detail below: 
• Actual Learn Time (ALT) is an estimate for the period of time it would 
take to teach an average individual to execute a given process.  There is no 
limit to the amount of time required. 
• Ordinal Rank is a measure of process complexity described as its 
difficulty to learn.  Subject Matter Experts, or Executives within an 
organization are asked to rank the processes in order from that which is 
easiest to learn, to that which is the most difficult to learn. 
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• Relative Learn Time (RLT) is a measure of the time it would take to teach 
an average individual the core processes of an organization given only 100 
hours, days, months, or other unit of time.  Subject Matter Experts or 
Executives must allocate the time appropriately to each process, with 
regard to that process’s complexity. 
Estimates may also be verified using actual knowledge measures such as 
on-the-job training time, or the number of process instructions within each core process.  
However, attaining a high degree of correlation and reliability between ALT, RLT, and 
Ordinal Rankings is the preferred method. (Housel & Bell, 2001) 
c. Total Learning Time 
The amount of knowledge embedded into the existing IT used in each core 
process must be captured.  This estimate is best achieved by considering what percentage 
of a process is automated.  This percentage estimate for IT is used to calculate the total 
learning time (TLT), and revenue is allocated proportionally.  Interestingly, the revenue 
attributed to IT-based knowledge, plus the cost to use that IT, often reveals that the value 
added to processes by IT applications, shown in the resulting ROK ratio, is not always 
equal to the percentage of IT and automation used in a process. (Housel & Bell, 2001)   
d. Process Instructions Approach 
In some cases, the Process Instruction Approach must be used to gain 
reliability of estimates.  This approach requires Subject Matter Experts to truly break 
apart each core process into the various subtasks that comprise it, in order to describe the 
products in terms of the “instructions required to reproduce them.”  By capturing the 
actual learning time of the subprocesses, one is better able to assign reliable estimates of 
the knowledge contained therein.  Just as the case in the Learning Time Approach, it is 
important that the estimates cited in Process Instructions only contain the knowledge 
required, or “in use” during execution of each individual process, without overlap.  By 
adding the ALT results for each subprocess within a core process, one has a more reliable 
estimate of the core process’s ALT.    
4. Measuring Utility and Knowledge Executions 
A count must be taken to determine the number of times the knowledge is 
executed (value) and the time is takes to execute (cost) in a given sample period.  These 
values are needed to determine the ROK value.  The actual time is takes to execute the 
process, multiplied by cost, is a flow-based estimate of its cost.  It is important to note 
25
that process costs alone, without reference to value, present a different picture of the core 
process’s value. 
5. The Relevance of Return on Knowledge (ROK) 
The return ratio known as ROK is expressed with a numerator representing the 
percentage of revenue allocated to amount of knowledge required to complete a given 
process successfully, in proportion to the total amount of knowledge required to generate 
the total outputs.  The denominator of the equation represents the cost to execute the 
process knowledge.  With knowledge as a surrogate for the process outputs measured in 
common units, a higher ROK signifies better utilization of knowledge assets.  In this 
way, KVA makes is possible to measure how well a specific process is doing in 
converting existing knowledge into value.  Similarly, it gives decision-makers an idea of 
how an investment in knowledge and learning is paying off, and not simply how much it 
costs.  The ROK value provides decision makers an analytical way to determine how 
knowledge can be more effectively used to produce better return on performance.  If 
increased automation does not improve the ROK value of a given process, steps must be 





































IV.  METHODOLOGY PROOF OF CONCEPT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Puget Sound Planning Yard is located in Bremerton, Washington, and is one 
of four public-sector U.S. Navy planning yards.  Responsible for planning the 
maintenance and modernization ship alteration jobs scheduled for the aircraft carriers 
stationed on the west coast and Japan, alongside the minesweeper force based in 
Ingleside, Texas, the Puget Sound Planning Yard boasts a mature work force and a well 
established shipcheck process.  The remaining three public Navy shipyards, along with 
their respective planning yards, are located in Norfolk, Virginia, Portsmouth, Maine, and 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.   
The following Proof-of-Concept analysis will use the “as-is” process information 
compiled from interviews and conversations with a select group of Subject Matter 
Experts from the Puget Sound Planning Yard.  Their input will be analyzed and verified 
by independent sources, and all estimates will be aggregated to reflect the cost and 
number of process executions for all U.S. public planning yard facilities.  The KVA 
methodology will be applied to analyze the theory that reengineered planning yard 
processes, with focus on the shipcheck, could positively affect the Navy’s maintenance 
and modernization efforts.  IT assets will be introduced in two sequential, notional 
scenarios.  If introduction of IT has an effect on current planning yard processes, it will 
be evident in increased ROK values, and associated cost estimates.  These figures will be 
shown as a comparison of the current, “as-is” scenario to the “to-be,” and “radical to-be” 
scenarios using defendable future process estimates. 
 
B. THE PURPOSE OF PLANNING YARDS 
The first step in determining the potential value of an IT investment requires 
analysis of the current process in place.  While the concept of a shipyard carries a basic 
conceptual understanding, the planning yard, which operates in support of shipyards and 
myriad other customers, is less intuitive and seldom understood outside of the industry. 
Planning Yards serve an essential support role within the larger framework of the Fleet 
Modernization Program.  For every ship maintenance or modernization task mandated by 
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the Department of the Navy (DoN), the Planning Yard receives funding through the 
Design Services Allocation (DSA), along with technical guidance and tasking orders to 
prepare the shipyard to complete that task.  The DSA is a funding line with provisions for 
design and SHIPALT development work, including Ship Alteration Requests (SAR), 
Ship installation drawings (SID), Liaison Action Requests (LAR), and Ship Service 
Request (SSR) update including Configuration Overhaul Planning (COP).  SHIPALTS 
constitute an order mandating the introduction, design, or installation of change to naval 
vessels.  
Planning Yards must compile all applicable data and job-related information for 
its end users, which is generally an industrial activity of some sort.  The end user may be 
the shipyard itself, a private-sector shipyard, or an entity independent of the planning 
yard and shipyard.  This work is necessary so that physical work required to accomplish a 
SHIPALT may be planned and accomplished with minimal system or human conflict.  
Ideally, all system interferences, problems, or conflicts relating to assigned SHIPALTS 
will be resolved by planning yard.  Planning Yards strive to achieve these tasks, among 
others, and to create quality installation drawings through the execution of a well tested 
process, and the retention of seasoned, experienced employees.   
The standard documents considered to be planning yard products, or “outputs,” 
include 2-dimensional (2D) detailed AUTOCAD drawings of ship compartments or 
installation areas, equipment removal routes, and material lists.  Less tangible outputs of 
this process include ship’s force/shipyard accord in regard to equipment configuration, 
and the assurance that alteration-specific capacities, such as sufficient chill water or 
electrical capacity for certain alterations, meet the requirements for a given SHIPALT. 
Figure 5 graphically depicts the organizational hierarchy of public Navy Planning 
Yards.  Although variations may exist between planning yard locations in terms of 
number of branches, and the type of staff support services required, all planning yards 





Figure 5.   Universal Planning Yard Organization3 
 
C. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
Aggregate data was gathered during an initial KVA knowledge audit conducted in 
a group interview setting, at the shipyard location in Bremerton, Washington.  At the 
initial meeting, five planning yard Subject Matter Experts (each having an expertise in 
one of four primary disciplines) and current employees of Puget Sound Planning Yard 
were present.  Each of the five Subject Matter Experts has over 20 years experience in the 
planning yard industry, with a high degree of expertise in his affiliated discipline.  A 
workflow model of the planning yard process (Figure 6) guided the interview. 
                                                 
3 To facilitate understanding of the planning yard process, this model was developed by Unified 
Industries Incorporated (UII) prior to the initial Group Interview in Bremerton, Washington, and 
disseminated to SIS vendor representatives and the NPS research team. 
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Figure 6.   Planning Yard Workflow Model 
 
1. Learning Time Method 
The method of analysis for this Proof of Concept is the Learning Time method.  
By interviewing the Subject Matter Experts (SME) in a group setting, it was possible to 
extract and establish consensus on what processes constitute the core planning yard 
processes, identify the inputs and outputs of those processes, and determine the frequency 
of core process iterations.  Boundaries were established between the defined processes in 
order to effectively apply the KVA methodology, and to properly identify and valuate the 
knowledge required for each.  The planning yard experts defined seven core processes, 
31
and described each to a great level of detail.  Each core process requires a certain level of 
knowledge in one or more of the following areas: administration, management, 
scheduling, budgeting, basic computer skills, drafting, engineering, shipboard systems, or 
AUTOCAD drafting and drawing development.  The Subject Matter Experts spent 
considerable time contemplating the amount of knowledge embedded in each core 
process, and provided learning time estimates for each.  The established baseline level of 
knowledge for consideration was a GS-6 employee with a college degree (no field 
specified).  Finally, the team of Subject Matter Experts provided individual and 
uninfluenced relative learning time and rank order estimates to establish the level of 
reliability on the ALT figures obtained.   
2. Process Instruction Method 
Preliminary analysis of the initial learning time estimates resulted in an 
insufficient level of correlation between learning time estimates and rank order estimates.  
As such, it was necessary to greater detail to evaluate each core planning yard process.  
During the process instructions interview session, Subject Matter Experts were asked to 
break each core process down into its component subprocesses, and in doing so, provide 
better estimates for the overall core process ALT by summing up the new values.  As 
established in the KVA theory, the subprocess learning time estimates can be backward 
allocated to each core process for greater reliability and degree of confidence.  The 
resulting and currently standing ALT calculations for the core processes were derived 
from the developed process instructions, and a correlation of greater than 80 percent was 
attained.   
 
D. THE DEFINED PLANNING YARD PROCESSES 
To best understand how a business process may be improved by way of 
reengineered or automated processes, one must first understand the current, “as is” 
process.  Subject Matter Experts described seven sequential core processes that 
encompass all planning yard work.  To best reference each core process, unofficial titles 
were coined, as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.   Planning Yard Core Processes 
 
This chain of core processes is executed for every naval vessel as it approaches its 
shipyard availability period.  The schedule, timeline and location for ship availabilities 
are established by Navy leadership far in advance, but calendar dates and work assigned 
may be constrained by budget allowances and other prioritization factors.  Further, 
availability schedules may be affected if world events trigger an unanticipated demand 
for operational naval assets.  For example, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom prompted major changes in the employment of naval forces.  
These events resulted in an ultimate surging to deploy seven carrier battle groups, and the 
largest Amphibious Task group assembled since World War II.  To enhance its readiness, 
the Navy implemented the Fleet Response Plan in May of 2003, which extends the 
scheduled time between ship availabilities from 24 months to 27 months. (H.R. Rep. No. 
GAO-04-724R, 2004) It is not certain what effect this availability delay will have on the 
Fleet material condition. 
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The core processes defined by the group of SME for operations at Puget Sound 
Planning Yard are described in detail below.  Operations at alternate public planning 
yards are assumed comparable in scope, duration, and knowledge requirements. 
1. Issue Tasking 
In the planning yard, a cycle of the core processes initiates when planning yard 
leadership receives formal tasking from a government source, which is ultimately 
regarded as the “customer.”  Because Navy ships operate with availability periods 
planned well in advance, tasking and funding is typically in line with a ship availability 
schedule, and is not unexpected.  However, the number and type of ship alterations that 
must be planned is variable.  Hence, the tasking order provides funding and direction for 
what the planning yard must accomplish on a given ship, and planning may begin.   
The current process begins when the planning yard receives formal tasking to 
accomplish work on a specific platform.  This tasking is traditionally delivered via email.  
The Project Manager (PM) must then consolidate and organize all tasks into an internal 
planning yard document called a Design Tasking Memorandum (DTM).  The DTM is 
issued to all applicable parties: the Lead and Follow Codes who, by virtue of their 
specialization, will accomplish a portion of the work contained within the DTM.  A 
“Lead Code” is the subspecialty which has the most significant role in a given alteration 
assignment.  Similarly, a “Follow Code” is the subspecialty who must perform work in a 
given assignment, but whose related subject matter skill set falls secondary to that of the 
lead codes’ because of the nature of the task.  Subject Matter Experts identified three 
subtasks of “Issue Tasking,” which includes budget and schedule planning, and the 
Production Line Manager’s (PLM) management of the overall process. 
2. Interpret Orders 
Disseminated via the planning yard’s email network, the DTM must be reviewed 
by all Lead and Follow Codes.  Lead Codes must use the guidance contained in the DTM 
to begin preparations for their assigned ship alterations.  There will be one lead code for 
each SHIPALT, and because there may be many SHIPALTs, many Lead Codes may 
exist in planning for one shipcheck.  Similarly, there may be many follow codes assigned 
to one SHIPALT.  To prepare for the shipcheck, Lead Codes collect and review official 
guidance and previously generated SHIPALT records to assist them as they produce Job 
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Information Sheets (JIS).  All JIS documents are distributed electronically via email to 
applicable Follow Codes for a given SHIPALT, so that Follow Codes are aware of their 
responsibilities.  Subject Matter Experts discussed three subtasks for the “Interpret 
Orders” core process, including communication between Lead and Follow Codes, 
beginning the SHIPALT data collection process, and the creation of the JIS. 
3. Plan for Shipcheck 
At this point, all Lead and Follow Codes are in receipt of their official guidance: 
the DTM and its respective JIS documents.  In this planning phase, all Codes begin more 
formal preparations for the actual shipcheck.  The duration of this process can vary since 
it is largely dependant on how much time exists between tasking and the actual shipcheck 
event.  Shipcheck planning primarily entails data collection and collaboration between 
Lead and Follow Codes, but there are also subprocesses critical to the success of the 
shipcheck.  In this phase, a shipcheck team is formed with consideration to the volume 
and complexity of SHIPALTs to be planned.  The Program Manager must contact the 
Commanding Officer (CO) of the shipcheck platform to verify its location and schedule.  
Finally, as the date of the shipcheck nears, the physical tools needed for work are 
assembled.   
4. Conduct Shipcheck 
Planning yard customers sometimes fall outside of the waterfront shipyard 
organization.  More often than not, however, planning yard products, which include 2-
dimensional CAD drawings, material lists, and equipment access routes, are often used 
by the actual shipyard facility to accomplish its mission of maintaining and modernizing 
the U.S. Naval Fleet.  Clearly, shipyard work requires significant planning before any 
worker can turn a wrench or make an installation.  For this reason, a shipcheck must 
always precede the actual ship availability period.  To begin this phase, the shipcheck 
team must first travel to the ship’s location.  For Puget Sound Planning Yard, travel is 
normally required to either San Diego, California, or Japan.  The team size and length of 
shipcheck depends on number of SHIPALTs, experience level of team members, and the 
complexity of the assigned tasks.  Subject Matter Experts agreed that a good estimate for 
shipcheck team size would be 30-35 personnel, representing both Lead and Follow 
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Codes.  Also, it was determined that the average length of a shipcheck was 10 working 
days, or two weeks.  For the entire shipcheck, one Group Leader will be assigned.   
Many activities occur during the shipcheck, including space walkthroughs, 
meetings, compartment sketching, and coordination with ship’s crew.  These activities 
are designed to validate “as is” ship configuration, to assess the compartments, 
equipment, or system intended for alteration to ensure systems will not conflict, and to 
plan equipment removal and entry routes.  Also, perhaps the most important product of 
the shipcheck process is rough sketches drawn to-scale, to later enter into CAD software 
to develop 2D drawings.   
5. Report Assembly 
Following the actual SHIPCHECK, the Lead Code, specifically, the Lead 
Designer, must assemble a SHIPALT Report.  In doing this, he or she must coordinate 
with all follow codes to accurately document all system conflicts that may result from 
implementation of the modernization and maintenance tasks at hand.  The SHIPALT 
Report is distributed to project stakeholders. 
6. Revise Schedule 
Once the SHIPCHECK is complete, the data collected during the process is taken 
and entered in to large database called DIS.  Once all data is entered into DIS, a report 
called the “Drawing Schedule” is automatically produced.  This Drawing Schedule 
automatically generates a revised schedule, and appropriate cost and manhour estimates.  
From these figures, the Program Manager can inform the customer of the expected cost 
and schedule, and revisions will be made as required. 
7. Generate Drawings 
Referencing the drawing list, the Lead Designer has the ultimate responsibility to 
ensure that sketches completed as part of the shipcheck are verified, developed, and 
completed in the standard CAD 2D format, as required by the FMP.  With each drawing, 
the applicable material list will be included.  Planning Yards generally expect to complete 
at least five ship installation drawings (SID) for every SHIPALT assigned, although the 
number of drawings varies.  Completed drawings are delivered to the customer, as 




E. KVA ANALYSIS OF “AS IS” SCENARIO 
A summary of the high level “as is” KVA analysis is depicted in Table 2, which 
contains the core planning yard processes.  While all initial estimates were compiled from 
Puget Sound Planning Yard sources, the overall analysis and data values have been 
aggregated to reveal information relevant to all four public-sector planning yards.  All 
estimates contained in this analysis are as conservative and accurate as possible.   
 
Table 2. Core Planning Yard Process Overview 
 
1. Head Count 
The “Head Count” column represents the number of employees assigned to 
complete the given process for each cycle, or iteration.  The numbers assigned are based 
on interviews with Subject Matter Experts, who agreed that the average shipcheck team 
composition is 35 personnel, including representatives of all Lead and Follow Codes.  By 
accounting for the number of personnel involved in each process, it can be determined 
how often knowledge is used.  It also provides an approximate way to weight the cost of 
using knowledge in each process.  
2. Times Fired 
The estimate for “Times Fired” is the aggregated number of occurrences of each 
process by public-sector planning yards, per year.  This value was achieved by looking at 
statistical information for fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005, and by considering the 
estimates provided by the Subject Matter Experts at Puget Sound Planning Yard.  
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According to the testimony of Rear Admiral Mark A. Hugel, Deputy Director for Fleet 
Readiness, in fiscal year 2003, 95 ship and submarine maintenance availabilities 
occurred.  The following year, fiscal year 2004, 73 maintenance availabilities were 
funded, with additional funding granted to perform depot and intermediate-level 
maintenance on 42 additional ships returning from Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
deployments.  Finally, there were 85 planned availabilities for fiscal year 2005. (Hugel, 
2005)  Puget Sound Planning Yard estimates that it performs the preliminary availability 
planning work on five platforms annually, and stressed that number can vary greatly year 
to year.  However, Puget Sound performs the work on aircraft carriers and minesweepers, 
which constitute a small percentage of the entire Navy Fleet.  To remain conservative, 
and to properly account for planning yard work outsourced to private industry, this study 
approximates that work across the four public planning yards amounts to 40 shipchecks 
per year.  As such, all “times fired” estimates were multiplied by this value for proper 
aggregation.   
Similarly, the Subject Matter Experts concluded that approximately 140 
SHIPALTS were planned during the course of one shipcheck, and for each assigned 
SHIPALT, approximately five drawings (process outputs) are created.  Again, because of 
the nature of Puget Sound’s specific hull assignments, it is likely that their average 
experience may be higher than the actual Fleet shipcheck (per ship) average.  For this 
analysis, it is assumed that 100 SHIPALTS occur per shipcheck process.  Furthermore, of 
these 100 SHIPALTS, an expected breakdown would be: 25 low-complexity alterations 
(a modification to a component or set of components), 25 high-complexity alterations (a 
modification to a major system), and 50 medium-complexity alterations (a modification 
to a subsystem).  Estimates in this analysis will be based on estimates for SHIPALTS of 
medium-complexity, the likely mean and most common SHIPALT performed.   
3. Actual Learning Time 
In order to determine the actual learning time from a common point of reference, 
the Subject Matter Experts were instructed to imagine a baseline individual of a college 
graduate at the GS-6 civilian rank level, having earned a college degree.  All experts 
understood that each process learning time estimate must adhere to the basic assumptions 
that knowledge is only counted if in use, and the most succinct path to achieve a unit of 
38
output must be considered.  Each core process was broken down into its component 
subprocesses through the process instruction approach, and respective ALT values were 
assigned for each subprocess.  The final ALT value for each core process is a summation 
of the subprocess ALT estimates.  Finally, all ALT values are based on the following 
time assumptions:  
• One year = 230 work days 
• One month = 20 work days 
• One week = 5 work days 
• One day = 8 hours 
4. Ordinal Ranking 
Executed as a process independent of the ALT estimates, Ordinal Rank Order 
provided the Subject Matter Experts a straightforward way to rank each core process in 
terms of their view of its relative complexity.  Because perception of process complexity 
can vary, the exercise was conducted in a manner to minimize peer interaction and 
influence.  In the ranking process, the number one (1) represents the core process 
considered the least complex and easiest to learn, while the number seven (7) represents 
the most complex and difficult to learn.  All processes are ranked in between accordingly.  
As previously discussed, the value in this exercise is attainment of level of reliability that 
learning time estimates are satisfactory.  This reliability is calculated through the 
statistical method of correlation.  The values in the ALT column must correlate well with 
the rank order numbers.  Achieving a correlation result greater than 0.80 is considered 
sufficient and ALT estimates should be accepted.  The level of correlation for the “as is” 
scenario is 0.84. 
5. Knowledge in IT 
Each process contains a certain degree of process automation, ranging from zero 
percent to 100 percent.  It is important to estimate precisely how much of each process is 
automated, and to be consistent in those estimates, so that the knowledge embedded in 
the technology resources is accounted for.  Upon determination of the percentage 
estimate, the Total Learning Time (TLT) is calculated based on that percentage.  Because 
it accounts for the knowledge embedded in the information technology assets of the 
organization, the TLT value is used to derive the “benefits” of each process. 
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6. Cost Estimation 
The collection of cost-related information was relatively simple, since information 
on human capital cost for government employees is public information.  For cost 
calculations, the 2005 GS salary pay table was referenced.  Since various steps and slight 
differences in pay exist within each GS rank, salary figures are based on the midpoint 
average pay of GS-12 planning yard employees ($62,353/year) and GS-11 employees 
($52,025/year).  It was determined that most planning yard processes executed are 
accomplished by personnel within these rank levels.  Research also indicates that Puget 
Sound carries a more mature work force than other shipyards; however, in this instance 
cost estimates will be based on what is known to exist at the Puget Sound location.  Also, 
because basic computing hardware and software is utilized in every scenario, IT cost is 
not included in the “as is” analysis.  It is assumed that each employee in this process has 
an email account, laptop or desktop computer with identical software, and access to a 
printer.  Material, travel, and other miscellaneous costs are not included in this analysis 
so labor cost may be isolated. 
7. “As-Is” Process Data Analysis 
Each core process below contains its respective process instructions in table 
format.  It is important to evaluate each subprocess in detail, as later comparison in the 
“to be” and “radical to be” scenarios are best explained at this level of detail. 
a. Key Assumptions 
As mentioned, this analysis is based on information collected at Puget 
Sound Planning Yard.  Because all Planning Yards operate under the guidance of the 
FMP, it is assumed that all processes are comparable.  Also, it is well known that all 
shipcheck-related processes can vary in number, manpower requirements, duration, and 
complexity.  After many interview sessions with planning yard SME in person, via 
teleconference, or through email, the following assumptions were made: 
• Between the four public sector planning yards, 40 shipchecks are 
accomplished.  Other naval shipchecks are outsourced to private planning 
yards. 
• The level of effort for each shipcheck is 100 SHIPALTS. 
• All estimates assume a SHIPALT of medium-complexity. 
• Each shipcheck team averages 35 personnel. 
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• The duration of a shipcheck is 10 workdays, with a travel day at each end. 
• For each SHIPALT, at least five sketches/drawings are created. 
• For each SHIPALT, approximately 10 digital photographs are captured. 
• Each SHIPCHECK will have five Lead Codes, and many Follow Codes. 
b. “Issue Tasking” KVA Analysis 
Table 3 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of core process one: 
 
Table 3. Core Process One “As Is” KVA 
 
As a management-based task, this process yields expected results.  The 
total cost is relatively low, as very few employees are involved in the scheduling and 
budget aspects of delivering the DTM, the output of this core process.  The overall cost 
was predictably low in relation to other processes because the rank structure of those 
employees involved in the included planning yard processes is more horizontally-oriented 
than most other organizations; the salaries used are that of either a GS-11 or GS-12, 
depending on the process.  The ALT values contained in the “plan shipcheck budget 
allocations,” and “coordinate and build schedule” were reduced to one day, because the 
knowledge which allows the PLM to oversee the task cannot overlap with these two 
activities.  This reduction enabled proper application of KVA methodology. 
c. “Interpret Orders” KVA Analysis 
Table 4 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of core process two: 
 
Table 4. Core Process 2 “As Is” KVA 
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Like the previous core process, the “Interpret Orders” core process has 
predictable return on knowledge results, but it uses the knowledge assets of more 
personnel, and is executed more often.  Because creation of the JIS is already an 
automated process, and one which depends on user input and coordination among the 
Lead and Follow Codes, there is no evidence to suggest this process should be changed.  
However, there is potential for improvement in the work time required to “begin data 
collection pertaining to tasking.”  Minimizing this work time with an improved way to 
manage and access information, would further improve the ROK.  Relative to other core 
processes, however, a ROK of 4.12 is positive, implying that this process makes effective 
use of knowledge resources. 
d. “Plan for Shipcheck” KVA Analysis 
Table 5 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of core process three: 
 
Table 5. Core Process 3 “As Is” KVA 
 
With an annual, aggregated cost of approximately $1.5 million, the ROK 
of this process is disproportionately low for all processes.  Because this core process is 
focused on planning for the shipcheck, it requires a tremendous amount of knowledge in 
proportion to its output: an ensemble of tools and reference material needed by each 
member of the team for work on the shipcheck platform.  Subject Matter Experts stated 
that finding the tools and reference materials required for each shipcheck executed 
requires knowledge and experience, because one must know what to look for, where to 
look for it, and how to acquire the resources needed (i.e., previous SID from shipcheck 
conducted on same ship class, lessons learned from previous SHIPALTs, etc.).  There is 
no central repository that enables easy access to Navy-wide information, beyond what 
has already been done “in house” at each Planning Yard facility.  Information sharing, 
and drawings reuse is not common.  This process has significant potential for 
improvement through the implementation of data sharing technology. 
42
e. “Conduct Shipcheck” KVA Analysis 
Table 6 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of core process four: 
 
Table 6. Core Process 4 “As Is” KVA 
 
Simple observation of the large number of subprocesses executed to 
complete a typical shipcheck reveals that the “conduct shipcheck” core process requires 
significant knowledge-assets, a large budget, and significant manpower.  Interestingly, 
reducing the time required to conduct a shipcheck provides the greatest opportunity to 
improve Navy ship cycle time.  Executing a shipcheck requires the second highest 
number of personnel workdays, outside of the “generate drawings” core process.  
Regardless of the number of personnel on the team, based on the subprocesses and work 
times estimated by the SME team, accomplishing one SHIPCHECK consumes 286 
workdays.  This figure explains the relatively high annual cost of $2.6 million dollars for 
the completion of 40 shipchecks (recall that planning yard duties outsourced to private 
industry are not included in this analysis).   
Observation of the ROK results indicates that the highest return on 
knowledge is achieved in the “conduct ship walkthrough” and “liaison with ship’s crew” 
subprocesses.  Considering the low cost of each, and the high return on knowledge each 
allows indicates effective knowledge management for both processes.  Conversely, one 
might also observe that the most expensive subprocess is “create rough sketches and 
schematic designs.”  This high cost, coupled with a moderate ROK value of 7.63, implies 
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that the knowledge embedded in the process of creating manual sketches could be better 
utilized. 
f. “Report Assembly” KVA Analysis 
Table 7 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of core process five. 
 
Table 7. Core Process 5 “As Is” KVA 
 
Before drafting a SHIPALT Report, the Lead Codes must confer with all 
Follow Codes and discuss any system conflicts relevant to SHIPALTS.  In determining 
system problems, much knowledge is used, and is properly demonstrated in a high 
process ROK of 6.10.  Recalling the similar process of “conduct ship walk-through” and 
its high ROK, it follows that determining system conflicts would have a similarly high 
ROK.  In fact, many system conflicts are determined prior to this phase in the overall 
process.  In this example, it is difficult to capture the instances where revisits to the ship 
for reassessment are necessary, as estimates for the percentage of cases in which this 
occurs were unavailable.  As such, the total cost applied to this core process is likely 
much lower than reality.  
g. “Revise Schedule” KVA Analysis 
Table 8 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of core process six. 
 
Table 8. Core Process 6 “As Is” KVA 
 
One of the primary objectives of planning yard work is to determine the 
budget and manhour requirements for each SHIPALT, so that the industrial activity can 
properly plan work execution.  These estimates are achieved after the shipcheck, by 
entering applicable data into an on-site database called DIS.  Without question, allocating 
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cost and time to each SHIPALT requires significant knowledge and experience, reflected 
in the high ALT value for “organize data to update DIS.”  Within the DIS information 
system, estimates for cost and time is automatically generated once all SHIPALT 
information is submitted.  Because it is a highly complex process, and managed 
reasonably, the ROK for this process ranks higher than the others. 
h. “Generate Drawings” KVA Analysis 
Table 9 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of core process seven. 
 
Table 9. Core Process 7 “As Is” KVA 
 
Of any process, the subtasks completed in the “Generate Drawings” core 
process are executed most frequently, based on the SME input that at least five drawings 
are generated for every SHIPALT performed.  In addition, a significant amount of 
knowledge is used per iteration, and the final output (the drawing) reflects that 
knowledge.  As mentioned in the “Report Assembly” process description, the task of 
generating drawings sometimes requires repeat visits to ships outside of the actual 
shipcheck period to validate sketches and ensure accuracy.  As stated, an estimate to 
capture this percentage was unavailable.  Similarly, the estimate of five drawings per 
SHIPALT is conservative, and it may be that in reality, many more drawings are required 
for complex SHIPALTS.  As a result of these two notions, the total cost as calculated is 
presumably lower than reality.  The impact on our analysis, however, is negligible, since 
conservative estimates are preferred.  
 
F. “TO-BE” PLANNING YARD PROCESS 
This scenario portrays a combination of notional and verified data to best 
represent current planning yard activities, reengineered to maximize utilization of new IT 
assets.  Not every subtask will be affected in this scenario; instead, only affected 
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processes will be used for comparison.  All others may be assumed static and as 
described in their “as is” state. 
1. Cost of IT 
The cost for laser scanning equipment and all applicable IT was provided by the 
Improved Engineering Design Process (IEDP) Project Manager for SIS.  For this study, 
the cost for IT was amortized for a 10 year period.  Given an initial cost of $88,000 for 
one 3DIS scanner plus its applicable software suite, a maintenance/upkeep annual cost 
estimate of 20 percent, a use estimate of 200 days per year, and a lifespan estimate of 10 
years, the resulting cost per day is: $132.00.  For analysis of the “to be” KVA, this cost is 
absorbed by the actual scanning process, and not distributed evenly among the processes 
that utilize the software suite for modeling.  This cost is based on the logistical ideal that 
one 3DIS scanner is shared between two planning yards.  Finally, 3DIS is rated for a 
lifespan of 20 years, although it is likely that system technological improvements would 
warrant an upgrade well before 20 years.  In reality, technological advancements tend to 
warrant IT product replacement well before their promised lifespan.  However, even with 
a five year expected lifespan, given the same maintenance assumptions, cost for this 
product is negligible at $176.00 per day.   
2. Reengineered Processes 
The primary change from the “as is” process to the “to be” is the introduction of 
Spatial Integrated System’s 3DIS laser scanner system and 3D data capture technology.  
Implementation of this system into the planning yard process will cause the process 
output to change from static installation drawings delivered on paper, to 3D digital 
images and models able to guarantee accuracy and precision.  Also, an added third 
dimension provides greater value to end users.  To account for this added value, outputs 
of the “to-be” process affected by the technology were assigned a conservative increase 
of 20%.  An important note is that although the output is in 3D, the 2D drawing currently 
required by FMP policy is easily created.  Because appropriate stakeholders would still 
benefit from the 3-dimensional models, the value is conserved, while downstream 
shipyard processes which require 2D drawings would be supported until a new policy and 
IT-based infrastructure supporting 3D digital imagery is implemented. 
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Table 10 depicts the change in cost and ROK values from the “as is” to the “to 
be” scenario.  Again, all values are aggregated to capture the cost for four public-sector 
shipyards.  The majority of the estimates contained in this KVA analysis were obtained 
from SIS Representatives, Puget Sound Planning Yard Subject Matter Experts, and 
various Trade Engineers with backgrounds in CAD 2D drafting and 3D modeling. 
 
Table 10. “As Is” and “To Be” Cost and ROK Value Differences 
 
Evident in the above table, despite the additional expense of the laser scanning 
system, the overall cost is still reduced by over $36 million dollars.  It is apparent that the 
cost-savings are achieved in the core processes directly influenced by new technology: 
process three, four, and seven.  Valuation of the return on knowledge of each process also 
shows that through the introduction of IT, the utilization of knowledge resources within 
those processes improved.  Finally, cost savings and return on knowledge improvements 
will be more visible and evident over time, as the technology matures, and becomes 
better implemented into the current process.  Work time and manpower requirements will 
decrease, and the quantity of 3D models available for reuse will increase.   
3. “To Be” Data Analysis 
Reengineering a notional, “to be” scenario presented several challenges.  
First, complete understanding of the current process was necessary before any alternate 
scenarios could be theorized.  Second, to make reasonable and conservative estimates of 
a “to be” scenario, knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the proposed IT 
resources, and their place within that current process, was required.  Finally, the 
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practicality of the IT resources, and the usefulness of 3D models and its respective 
products beyond the confines of the planning yards, were considered in each scenario. 
For greater understanding, Core Process three, four, and seven will be scaled 
down to each group of subtasks.  Since no values changed in the other processes, they 
will not be included in this section. 
a. “Plan for Shipcheck” To Be KVA Analysis 
Table 11 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of the notional “to be” revision of 
process three.  Core process one and two are omitted because introduction of 3D data 
capturing technology had no influence on those tasks. 
 
Table 11. KVA Analysis of To Be “Plan for Shipcheck” Process 
 
Several assumptions were made that account for the cost-savings reflected 
in the processes associated with planning a shipcheck.  First, use of the laser scanning 
technology reduces the number of personnel necessary for the shipcheck team, because 
the process of manual hand sketching has been superseded.  The revised team size in this 
scenario consists of 15 personnel, reduced from the original “as is” size of 35.  As such, 
only 15 personnel will need to gather information in preparation for each shipcheck.  At 
the same time, access to stored digital information from previous shipchecks will 
improve the data collection process.  Changed values are shown in red.   
b. “Conduct Shipcheck” To Be KVA Analysis 
Table 12 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 




Table 12. KVA Analysis of To Be “Conduct Shipcheck” Process 
 
Reducing the time required to complete this process will provide the 
greatest potential to reduce the time required to conduct shipchecks, and increase the time 
a Navy ship is available for operational tasking.  Again, the shipcheck team size has been 
reduced from 35 to 15 personnel.  In place of hand-sketched ship installation drawings, a 
laser scanner captures a point cloud image of the area or compartment specified in the 
SHIPALT.  It is important to realize the fundamental change in this scenario: where a 
single sketch was once created for each required SID, the laser scanner can now capture a 
model from which an infinite number of 3D and 2D images, image redesigns, and the 
SHIPALT required installation drawings (SIDS), can be produced.  For this exercise, it is 
assumed that 20 area or compartment scans are required to achieve the same level of 
output as the current “conduct shipcheck” scenario.   
Laser Scanner Developers have documented performance times that reveal 
the time to capture a reliable, average quality point cloud is two to three hours for a low 
complexity space, such as a ship’s fan room, four to six hours for a medium complexity 
space, such as a stateroom or office space, and eight to 12 hours for a high-complexity 
space, such as Combat Information Center (CIC) or a Main Machinery Room (MMR).  
These estimates are based on laser scanning work accomplished on 25 different Navy 
ships in recent years.  The estimate used in this core process is four hours; that is, the 
time to capture a compartment of medium complexity.  Experts agree that as experience 
and technology improve, the time required to capture a quality scan will be significantly 
reduced.  In fact, the most recent 3DIS model created by Spatial Integrated Systems (SIS) 
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reduces these documented scan times by 50 percent.  For each compartment scanned, one 
system operator is sufficient.  Obviously, the time required on board is directly 
proportional to the number of scanners, and scanner operators available to complete the 
required work.   
For the specific subtasks reengineered to include 3D laser scanning or 
digital images, the ALT values were increased by a conservative 20 percent to reflect the 
additional knowledge embedded in a more valuable output.  Three dimensions are 
inherently more complex than two dimensions.  As is evident in the below table, the 
ROK of the “scan and capture point cloud images” process increased considerably.  At 
the same time, the cost to execute this process is moderate, despite the cost of the laser 
scanner and software suite (price $132/day over 10 year period, not shown in table).   
c. “Generate Drawings” To Be KVA Analysis 
Table 13 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of the notional “to be” revision of 
process seven.  Again, core processes five and six are omitted because introduction of 3D 
data capture technology had no influence on those tasks. 
 
Table 13. KVA Analysis of To Be “Generate Drawings” Process 
 
As learned in analysis of the “as is” process to generate drawings, it is the 
most time-consuming task executed by planning yards.  Experts note that on average, a 
typical AUTOCAD drawing requires approximately 40 hours of “thinking” and 40 hours 
of actual drawing in the software.4  Of course, this depends greatly on the complexity of 
the drawing and the number of systems affected by the SHIPALT.  Much of the 
“thinking,” and “drawing,” is actually done concurrently.  With the introduction of 3D 
digital capture technology, the bulk of the drawing development task is no longer 
required, since the laser scanner automatically captures the image, and with 3D imaging,                                                  
4 This estimate has two sources: personal e-mail received from an engineer with 20 years planning 
yard and CAD experience, with agreement from a Branch Manager at Puget Sound Planning Yard.   
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engineering an alteration is simplified.  With less problem-solving required to apply the 
mandated alteration to the current configuration, work time is significantly reduced.   
Data processing is a necessary subprocess of this task.  After an image 
point cloud is captured, data processing occurs.  To accomplish this, a human operator 
establishes relationships between the “points in space” captured in the point cloud, using 
point processing software.  This step replaces the “as is” task of physically engineering 
and drawing a SID on paper to be recreated in a CAD or AUTOCAD application.  Actual 
3D modeling follows this step, which replaces the former step of drawing the 2D SID in 
AUTOCAD.  While the “model processed data to 3D” has a high total cost, the 
downstream benefit is enormous, reflected in the considerable ROK of “generate 2D 
drawings.”  From a purely analytical vantage, the ROK figure is large because the work 
time is significantly reduced from the previous “as is” subtask which created 2D 
drawings in CAD.  Using the 3D model generated in this “to be” scenario, however, 
creation of a 2D paper drawing may be likened to a snapshot within the software 
application.  The improved return on knowledge in this notional scenario, particularly in 
the “generate 2D drawings” subprocess, is noteworthy. 
 
G. “RADICAL-TO-BE” PLANNING YARD PROCESS 
1. Reengineered Processes 
This notional scenario presents the ideal state for Planning Yards, with maximum 
employment of laser scanners, 3D digital imaging, data warehousing, a robust database 
management system (DBMS), and collaborative environments.  In reality, a reasonable 
transition to this state might take many years.  All organizational transition takes time, 
effort, and a common effort.  Starting with revised policy, a strategic goal, an acquisition 
effort in line with the revised policy and strategy, appropriate test locations for gradual 
evaluation, and finally, large-scale implementation in the planning yard environment, 
evolving to the state of readiness portrayed in this radical scenario is feasible. 
To best present this scenario, collaborative environment specialists at UGS 
Corporation, a leading global provider of product lifecycle management software and 
services, were interviewed.  The core processes and subtasks were reengineered 
appropriately to reflect the value added through a collaborative environment.  Moreover, 
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because of the nature of technology is to evolve and improve, this scenario assumes ship 
3D data is accessible to all stakeholders in the planning yard process.  It also assumes 
minor decreases in laser scanner capture and required modeling work time.  In this 
scenario, revisions to the FMP replace the requirement for 2D physical ship installation 
drawings with digital images, accessible via a network.  As one indirect advantage, all 
stakeholders have instant access to all data generated by any planning yard or industrial 
activity.  The most obvious advantages of collaborative environments are seen in those 
processes pertaining to planning. 
As evident in the Table 14, the cost savings introduced in this scenario are 
significant.  The following sections will explain each reengineered process in detail. 
 
Table 14. “As Is and “Radical To Be” Cost and ROK Comparison 
 
2. Radical “To Be” Data Analysis 
The following tables are theoretical interpretations built on the previous “as is” 
scenario iteration, and portray how implementation of a planning-yard specific 
collaborative environment could affect the “as is” process by promoting interoperability, 
reusability of products, and knowledge sharing.  Any “as is” or “to be” values changed 
are annotated in blue.  Unaffected core processes are not discussed. 
a. “Interpret Orders” Radical “To Be” KVA Analysis 
Table 15 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of the notional “radical to be” 
revision of process two. 
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Table 15. KVA Analysis of Radical To Be “Interpret Orders” Process 
 
A primary assumption of this scenario is that a collaborative environment 
has been created, allowing all stakeholders and shipcheck-planners instant, real-time 
access to a database of reusable 3D images collected over time from various planning 
yard facilities.  The collaborative environment also promotes effective coordination and 
communication between many engineers.  As a result, communication and data collection 
tasks work times are reduced by 50 percent.  Similarly, because of the amount of 
technology applied to a once manual process, the percentage of IT increased.  These 
factors enabled the ROK of this process to double over previous scenarios, and reduced 
cost by roughly 40 percent. 
b. “Plan for Shipcheck” Radical “To Be” KVA Analysis 
Table 16 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of the notional “radical to be” 
revision of process three. 
 
Table 16. KVA Analysis of Radical To Be “Plan for Shipcheck” Process 
 
This core process is also focused on planning for a shipcheck.  
Consequently, the same assumptions from the “interpret orders” process may be applied 
here; engineers may find necessary SHIPALT data more quickly and easily through a 
collaborative interface.  This assumption justifies the work time reduction to two and a 
half days per worker, rather than the “as is” work time of five days.  With instant access 
to data from other Planning Yards and SHIPALTS, shipcheck teams will be more 
prepared for the work at hand.  Constructive, time-saving problem solving discussion can 
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occur among the Lead and Follow Codes and other outside organizations prior to the 
actual shipcheck. 
c. “Conduct Shipcheck” Radical “To Be” KVA Analysis 
Table 17 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of the notional “radical to be” 
revision of process four. 
 
Table 17. KVA Analysis of Radical To Be “Conduct Shipcheck” Process 
 
This process contains an assumption that scan times will be reduced.  In 
reality, a scanner capable of the work time presented here already exists, but documented 
data is not yet available.5  A ship compartment of medium-complexity can be scanned in 
two hours, with one operator.  In this scenario, two scanners are available, so the duration 
of the shipcheck may be reduced.  Also, removal data information can be determined by 
looking at 3D ship models prior to going onboard, and time spent executing this process 
during the actual shipcheck will be for verification purposes only.  Time required to 
complete the ship walk-through process has been reduced because the majority of system 
and subsystem conflicts were identified and resolved quickly and easily in the planning 
stage.  As such, shipcheck walk-through procedures are also primarily for verification.  If 
problems or unexpected difficulties arise during the shipcheck, they may be addressed 
through a collaborative interface, and access to many engineering experts is possible. 
What is most notable about this “radical to be” reengineered process is the 
significant cost savings and impressive ROK improvements.  Because of reduced 
                                                 
5 SIS reports its new model, released in the Fall, 2005, reduces its predecessor’s scan times by 50 
percent. 
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manpower requirements, minimal shipcheck duration, and better utilization of knowledge 
assets, cost was reduced from the “as is” scenario by 50 percent, and the process ROK 
increased by 450 percent.   
d. “Generate Drawings” Radical “To Be” KVA Analysis 
Table 18 shows all KVA estimates used to determine the total process 
benefits, annual cost, and return on knowledge (ROK) of the notional “radical to be” 
revision of process seven. 
 
Table 18. KVA Analysis of Radical To Be “Generate Drawings” Process 
 
It is assumed that as experience in 3D data processing and modeling 
matures, and software improvements are made, work times for these related subprocesses 
will decrease.  In this reengineered scenario, work times are decreased by 25 percent; 
reducing the work time for data processing to two days, and model processing to 15 days.  
Object reuse in this process accounts for 25 percent of all SHIPALTS, reducing the 
demand to produce new models, decreasing work time further.  Again, the improvement 
from the “as is” ROK value for this core process from 0.42 to 30.77 is phenomenal, and 
highlights an impressive use of knowledge resources.  Similarly, the cost reduction from 
the current process execution cost of $39 million dollars annually, to just over $2 million, 
is remarkable. 
 
H. THE PRODUCTION VALUE 
Digital imaging in 3D and collaborative environments have great potential for 
improving the various processes employed in maintenance, modernization, and repair 
production.  While outside the actual analysis of planning yard processes, the possibilities 
these interrelated IT resources provide deserve mention.  As is the case within the 
Planning Yard environment, the 3D scan data and documents relative to planning work, 
stored as reference data in a database, is instantly available to shipyard Engineers.  As 
such, Engineers have the ability to electronically communicate with many different 
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experts when needed, view installation drawings, and consider a SHIPALTS actual 
manufacturability, and material availability much earlier in the process.  Collaboration, in 
this way, provides a unique ability to view, edit, and analyze SHIPALT-pertinent data.  
Finally, all stakeholders can track work progress and stay abreast of changes.  For these 
reasons, one can easily conclude that the improved capabilities of the planning yards will 
have a positive impact on all areas of the shipyard industry, including production. 
 
I. FINAL COMPARISONS 
The following figures graphically show the cost-savings and manpower 
reductions introduced by the notional, technology-enhanced scenarios.  Of all the core 
processes presented in this research, the most significant and positive changes occurred in 
the “conduct shipcheck,” and “generate drawing” core processes.  One way to reduce 
overall cost is to reduce labor expenses.  Figure 8 shows the potential reduction in total 
workdays required, annually, between the four public-sector planning yards to complete 














AS IS TO BE RADICAL
Scenario
Manpower Requirements for "Conduct Shipcheck" Core Process
 
Figure 8.   Manpower Comparison Chart for “Conduct Shipcheck” Process 
 
The difference is even more dramatic in the manpower reductions in the “generate 
drawings” core process.  Because a once-manual effort is largely replaced by a more 
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automated digital capture, and the subsequent creation of a 3D model capable of 
producing many, reusable 2D or 3D ship installation drawings, the requirement for a 
large work force is minimized.  An annual requirement of roughly 20,000 installation 
drawings for 40 shipchecks, with 100 SHIPALTS each, can be reduced from 3,960 paid 
work days (regardless of the number of workers) to only 256 paid work days.  Figure 9 















AS IS TO BE RADICAL
Scenario
Manpower Requirements for "Generate Drawings" Core Process
 
Figure 9.   Manpower Comparison Chart for “Generate Drawings” Process 
 
As it is currently executed, the “generate drawings” process is very manpower-
intensive.  This is because the majority of the process is manual, translating from a sketch 
on paper, or a pencil-marked revision to a previous SID, to a two-dimensional AutoCAD 
paper drawing.  As evident in the above chart, through automation of the SID, manpower 
requirements are significantly reduced.   
Another means for comparison is established using the cost plus method.6  By 
establishing the revenue for all planning yard processes, the number of outputs (reflected 
by “total benefits”) is used to establish respective core process revenues.  With these core 
process revenue amounts determined, a derivative form of Return on Knowledge, called 
                                                 
6 The cost plus method is a pricing method commonly used by firms, and in government contracts.  
The common thread in cost plus pricing is that a baseline cost is established, then a percentage is added to 
account for profit. 
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Return on Knowledge Investment, (ROKI) may be calculated.  The core processes 
yielding the highest percentage of ROKI can be said to generate the highest return on 
investment, given the human and IT knowledge-based assets contained in that process, in 
creating process outputs.  Table 19 and Table 20 show the “as is” and “to be” results, 
respectively.  The total core process benefits, percentage of process benefits against the 
sum of all benefits, revenue, annual cost, ROK and ROKI values for each core process 
may be compared.   
 
Table 19. “As Is” Return on Investment Figures 
 
In Table 19, the ROKI for the “revise schedule” process is very high.  As an 
automated process—one able to calculate manhours, schedule, and budget requirements, 
this makes sense.  As would be expected, ROKI follows the same trend as ROK, although 
represented in a different form.  The reengineered processes in the “to be” scenario are 
evident in the improved ROK and ROKI values of processes four and seven, below. 
 




























V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The Proof of Concept was generated from SME input from only one planning 
yard facility, and generalized for the others based on this input.  Therefore, the data 
contained in this research cannot be assumed perfect.  Additionally, because of the 
maturity and high level of expertise of the select group of interviewees, establishing a 
high degree of reliability was challenging.  There were varying opinions on which 
processes were the most complex, least complex, and so forth.  Furthermore, time and 
distance restrictions limited the amount of research SME interaction, which compounded 
the problem.  If more time had been available, KVA learning time values would have 
been collected through use of the process instruction method up front, and more reliable 
initial estimates would have resulted.   
At the same time, 3D data capture technologies cannot be assumed a perfect 
solution for every ship maintenance and modernization task.  For instance, SHIPALTS 
occurring in compartments with significant piping, wiring, or electrical circuitry may not 
be ideal candidates for 3D modeling.  Furthermore, it is not clear if labor costs and skill 
sets required for 3D data capture and modeling would be significantly higher than current 
process rates.  Finally, the estimated cost of collaborative technology software was not 
available for this research.  Because software cost tends to be high, the final “radical to 
be” cost could drastically increase with this revision.  Nevertheless, the positive impact of 
both technologies is still apparent.   
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Careful analysis of the Proof of Concept does reveal the significant potential 
value IT resources may contribute to the Navy shipyard planning process.  Digital 3D 
data capture, with its high quality, accurate, and reusable product outputs, alongside the 
information storage and sharing capabilities of a collaborative environment, may prove 
useful in naval ship maintenance and modernization planning and production efforts.  As 
previously mentioned, however, any new IT introduced into modern organizations carries 
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a certain degree of risk.  Application of this KVA methodology to the Planning Yard 
Proof of Concept has yielded one type of decision support model to demonstrate the 
potential impact of 3D laser scanners and collaborative technologies within this 
environment. 
Through use of analytical, measurable data, it has been shown that acquisition of 
these technologies could, over time, significantly decrease cycle time for U.S. Navy ships 
by expediting maintenance work in shipyards, lessen maintenance costs by eliminating or 
reducing DOD planning yard labor costs, provide an opportunity to reduce fleet inventory 
requirements by way of reduced cycle time, and overall, improve productivity in current 
planning yard shipcheck processes to a degree which would allow for increased 
shipboard modernization. 
1. Navy Fleet Cycle Time 
An improved Fleet cycle time allows a higher availability of assets to Operational 
Commanders at any given time.  If availability period durations are reduced, and the 
same level of work accomplished (i.e., all planned SHIPALTS completed), it would 
follow that the Fleet Cycle time would be improved.  The Proof of Concept case study 
revealed that shipcheck durations could be reduced by 50 percent.  While this value is 
limited to one specific aspect of the availability process--the planning yard, collaborative 
environments show much potential to improve production processes.  Collectively, if 
every operational Navy ship was available one additional week for tasking, over a two 
year time-span, the DoN would have 280 additional weeks for tasking assignments, 
training, or crew rest and relaxation opportunities.   
Further, digital images provide a level of accuracy and promote a sense of 
trustworthiness that cannot be attributed to the current process of manual hand-sketches, 
which would eliminate redundant checks and time spent verifying drawings while in 
production.  Finally, with these technologies, information availability becomes less 
episodic, and would allow Navy planners to schedule minimal maintenance activity and 
planning between major availability periods, because capturing the data for analysis of 
study of a space can occur at any time.  Downstream processes, including the industrial 
activity executing the work, will experience reduced work time as a result, further 
minimizing fleet cycle time.   
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2. Cost-Savings 
Of any potential advantage offered by 3D data capture and collaboration, the cost-
savings is the most apparent and profound conclusion.  Considering the analysis included 
only labor costs, plus the added cost of IT within each notional scenario, and that all “to 
be” and “radical to be” assumptions are defendable, the results are significant. 
The U.S. government currently pays nearly $45 million dollars to complete the 
shipcheck cycle an estimated 40 times each year.  As a reminder, this cost estimate is 
based solely on labor rates, and excludes expenses such as travel and material.  It consists 
of only those shipchecks conducted by the four public-sector planning yards.  In the 
revised, “to be” scenario, this cost drops to only $8 million; a remarkable reduction of 84 
percent.  Interestingly, within the KVA analysis framework, there are two distinct paths 
one could take to account for this cost savings.  The obvious path is achieved by a 
reduction in manpower, which provides the ability to accomplish the same job with fewer 
personnel.  The other path involves the same number of personnel accomplishing the 
same task more quickly, and as a consequence, a percentage of the work force would be 
available for more tasking, alternate tasking, or improved training.  Nevertheless, the cost 
savings potential for this application is worth consideration.   
3. Force Planning & Expanded Capability 
It is surmised that expediting the planning yard process will, in turn, create a 
ripple effect through all industrial activity for maintenance and modernization of naval 
assets.  In time, reducing the duration of ship availabilities, and providing more 
operational availability of naval assets, could provide leadership incentive to reduce the 
size of the Fleet.  On one hand, leadership could schedule increased time gaps between 
new ship acquisitions, or allow ship decommissioning to occur at an earlier, more 
realistic phase of its current expected life cycle.   
At the same time, Fleet Size is largely dependant on world events, and the 
operational requirements and goals of the Commander in Chief (CIC).  With an improved 
cycle time for maintenance and modernization activities, a viable option would be 
increased levels of ship alterations, for the improvement of ship weapons, sensing, 
propulsion, navigation, or health and habitability issues. 
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C. REAL OPTIONS 
The technologies presented in this research provide a variety of future options, 
including several phased option scenarios, several instant IT acquisition scenarios, and 
several which take the technology and expand to other applicable areas.  The most 
valuable of all determined options are listed below: 
• Do nothing, allow the current “as is” process to evolve. 
• Immediately acquire only the 3D data capture technology, without a 
collaborative environment, at one planning yard.  If successful, expand 
capability to all public-sector planning yards. 
• Immediately acquire both 3D data capture technology and collaborative 
technologies, at one planning yard.  If successful, expand capability to all 
public-sector planning yards. 
• Acquire both 3D data capture technology and collaborative technologies 
for all public-sector planning yards.  If successful, consider applications 
beyond maintenance and modernization, such as shipbuilding, ship repair, 
and production activities. 
• Immediately acquire laser scanning technology, with plans to adopt 
collaborative technologies within a certain timeframe (once a digital data 
warehouse of 3D models has accumulated to a valuable degree).   
• Consider the policy revisions necessary for inclusion of 3D digital models 
into current Navy shipyard processes.  Acquire technologies over time, for 
all Navy shipyard facilities. 
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NAVY 
Standardization of processes among public and private planning yards, and the 
aindustrial activities that build, repair, maintain, and modernize naval vessels is 
underway.  The end goal of this standardization, in accordance with SHIPMAIN and 
various other incentives, is process improvement through data sharing.  In one word, the 
overarching goal within the shipyard and planning yard community is interoperability. 
Such a vision is necessary to move towards business practices that best utilize the 
technology available.  It does not appear, however, that vision is the problem.  Navy 
leadership is aware of what must occur to enable the establishment of a solid, IT-based 
infrastructure in the realm of industrial activity.  There is positive momentum towards the 
achievement of this goal.  However, the iterations of change tend to be slow, with many 
obstacles along the evolutionary path.  As a result, the technological capability is 
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spiraling beyond the present day.  Naval leadership must not have a static vision, but 
instead be visionaries, constantly reevaluating the end state of their goals.  In this age of 
technology, the rate of advancements is not linear, but exponential.  To stay competitive 
and improve processes using IT, one cannot afford to rest on a plateau.   
It would benefit the Navy to begin a transition of change that would exploit the 
full capability research and development entities promise.  If plans exist to create a 
common data repository for planning yards, its downstream industrial partners, and 
various stakeholders at all levels of the Chain of Command, then it should be designed to 
be as useful an asset as possible.  A large-scale database enabling interoperability should 
include a capacity to store and manage both 2D and 3D data.  By designing the database 
with the necessary tables and corresponding attributes for 3D, it would be ready for 
future growth into the 3D domain.  A Database Management System (DBMS) must be 
capable of ensuring the integrity and availability of database information. 
With all IT investments, cost tends to be front-loaded, and any benefit is only 
maximized with time.  Risk is always present with IT investments.  Data capturing 
technology, such as laser scanners, and the data sharing qualities of collaborative 
environments are not an exception to these rules.  It is the responsibility of decision-
makers to consider the amount of this risk in proportion to the potential value the 
technology may provide in time.  The return would not be immediate, and current 
planning yard and shipyard processes would require modification.  However, the value of 
3D data capturing capability and collaboration is more than outwardly intuitive; it is 
backed by the analytical methodology presented in this research, and in respective ROK 
values.   
Finally, an important consideration outside the scope of this thesis is the 
incredible number of applications this duo of technological assets could serve.  First, 
repair efforts would be enhanced because geographical constraints would be removed.  If 
a ship or submarine is underway or overseas, repair processes could be expedited through 
a collaborative interface with ship repair agencies, supply personnel, and other 
stakeholders, using 3D digital models of the damage captured by a laser scanner.  On 
vessels where maximum utility of space is critical, such as amphibious assault ships 
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loaded out with Marine Corps equipment and aircraft, 3D models of storage areas would 
facilitate and improve planning.  If new aircraft is introduced to the Fleet, such as the V-
22 Osprey, with its unconventional design, 3D models of hangar decks could aid Air 
Department’s layout.   
3D modeling has potential applications in the area of ship damage control, in 
assisting in incidents of actual battle damage, or fire, flooding, or other ship emergency.  
Similarly, these models would be beneficial in training commands, from boot camp on.  
Modeling would be advantageous for shipbuilding, and configuration control of ships 
built within the same class.  There are a myriad of possibilities for this technology that 
make up for its current limitations.  The scope is as far as imagination and funding 
provides.  In the interim, these technological assets could be applied as an initial step 
towards a more enduring strategy. 
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